The paper presents a distinctive approach to cross-border ties between Europeans. In place of the standard focus on identity or trust, it recommends the study of practices of social comparison, understood as how citizens evoke relevant others for the purpose of situating and evaluating their experiences. The first section offers a conceptual analysis of social comparison, building on and extending social-psychological accounts. The second section shows how the emergence of the European Union presents new opportunities for social comparison. By generating diverse social encounters, new information resources, and an extension in the scope of common legislation, it invites citizens to compare their daily experiences with those of people further afield and to evoke reference groups outside their country of residence. The third section looks at the political significance of these emergent practices, be it for the perception of injustice, the sense of personal misfortune, or the development of new forms of cross-national subjecthood. *
Introduction
One way to approach the human world is in terms of a distinction between system and social integration. Theorists have made it in various forms, so let us delineate it as follows. System integration evokes a world whose emergence and reproduction is not reducible to the intentions and understandings of individual actors within it. It is the world of structures and institutions, including the market, the law and the industrial-technological complex, all seen from an observer's perspective. Social integration by contrast evokes a world of actors, and of human relations recognisable and meaningful to those immersed in them. It is the world of allegiances, conflicts and mutual concern. 1 Ultimately, system and social integration may be considered two different methodological responses to the same challengethat of rendering the world and its patterns intelligible -and one need not suppose the existence of two separate spheres. The appeal of the distinction lies in its ability to highlight tensions and contradictions, e.g. between functionality and legitimacy. In contemporary EU scholarship, system integration is the prime focus of various strands of institutionalism in political 1 For the distinction in its original form, see Lockwood 1964, p.371 ; for overviews of various reworkings, see Mouzelis 2008 , Joas and Knöbl 2009 , Delanty and Rumford 2005 In European studies, the relation between system and social integration was one of the main themes of debate amongst functionalist, federalist and neo-functionalist observers of post-War Europe as well as interested actors themselves. Often these debates were framed in terms of the relative significance of economic integration on the one hand and political-cultural integration on the other, an articulation liable to create an overly strong distinction between the economic as the domain of material interests and system imperatives and the political-cultural as the domain of beliefs and ideas. science, legal studies and political economy, where system-evoking notions of 'adaptational pressure', 'goodness of fit' and 'incentive structure' are commonplace. Social integration meanwhile has been attended to in research on European identity, cross-border trust and the EU's politicisation. Perhaps the standard interpretation is that the contemporary European sphere, when approached in terms of system integration, is considerably more densely enmeshed than when approached in terms of social integration, but that this situation cannot persist indefinitely without destabilising consequencesindeed, that its consequences may be fatal when the EU hits times of crisis. This paper addresses social integration primarily, with the aim of exploring one of its less familiar forms -practices of social comparison. Its purpose is to show how changing popular perceptions can be conceptualised differently from the identity problematic commonly favoured in EU studies, and -as a contribution to political sociology and social psychology -to theorise in some detail the structure and wider implications of social comparison. One of the paper's themes however is the interplay between this form of social integration and the wider European context of system integration.
Developments associated with the latter -rights to cross-border movement, for instance -provide opportunities and stimuli for new social relations, as well as perhaps depending for their long-term existence on the development and consolidation of these relations.
Social comparison in the sense we shall discuss it entails a human subject's evocation of relevant others for the purpose of a relative appraisal of conditions. It involves positing the existence of those parallel to the self who, as judged against a certain criterion, may be deemed to resemble (more so or less so) that self. 2 These relevant others may be distant in space, and only in some cases encountered. The prospect which institutional developments in Europe raise -especially sharply perhaps, but not unlike wider processes of globalisation -is that relevant others come increasingly to be perceived crossas well as intra-nationally, thus entailing a widening of social horizons as new figures fall within attentive range. Unlike more familiar forms of social integration, such as a convergence of identities, norms and values or a deepening of interpersonal trust, social comparison need not produce generally harmonious social relations. In some cases it may spur a sense of common predicament, and thus the basis for ties of solidarity. In others it may produce an affirmation of difference, prompting indifference or hostility and possibly social upheaval. Accordingly it will have feedback effects for system integration, consolidating it, reforming it, or placing it in question.
Methodologically, social comparison is best treated as an interpretative heuristic -a way of making sense, in idealised form, of how others in turn make sense of the social world. Rather than to postulate hard psychological laws governing beliefs and behaviour, the goal is to suggest patterned ways of thinking which, though likely to recur in some contexts especially, take a variety of forms and can produce more than one outcome, due to the way they combine unpredictably with secondary factors. Social theorists use the concept of mechanism to capture this mix of regularity and indeterminacy (Elster 2007) . 3 Practices of social comparison and their socio-political consequences are usefully approached as such, sensitising us to general tendencies of likely significance whose articulation and impact in the 2 As we shall note, the perception of similarity is only one possible outcome, and even where present it is domain-specific. Parallel lives are not convergent lives -the subjects retain their distinctiveness. 3 Some approaches to social mechanisms (e.g. Hedström and Swedberg 1998) invoke them as means to give precision to an explanatory account. Here we do not wish to explain determined outcomes -the practices we describe remain half-formed, and their ultimate consequences as yet opaque -but instead to identify some important current trends, to chart future trajectories, and develop the building-blocks from which explanatory accounts might proceed. particular instance will still need to be analysed by historical, i.e. contextual, means. By elaborating such mechanisms, we sharpen our eye for the trends of the present, and give orientation to future research.
Varieties of Social Comparison and their Significance
The concept of social comparison has its origins in social psychology (Festinger 1954; see also Masters and Smith 1987; Suls et al. 2002; Guimond 2006) . Early discussions presented it as a kind of need, grounded in the functional importance to the individual of accurate self-appraisal. In order to navigate life's demands, particularly in a complex society, individuals require knowledge about their relative strengths and weaknesses, and about which features they share with others and which are distinctive -knowledge achievable only through juxtaposition with the opinions and abilities of others. Comparison thus offers the subject a means of orientating and understanding themselves. More recent approaches, while continuing to focus on motivation, have located the impulse in a need to evaluate, in particular to accord positive evaluation to the self. In this perspective, comparison offers possibilities for enhancing self-image, especially where subjects deliberately pursue 'downward comparison' by matching themselves against an inferior (Suls et al. 2002) . Researchers' ongoing focus on cognitive motivation clearly has much to do with the disciplinary focus of psychology.
But related research agendas more social and political in their focus have emerged also, notably the study of 'relative deprivation' (Runciman 1966) .
Let us first consider social comparison from a formal perspective, before thinking about its contemporary manifestations. Clearly not all comparison is 'social'. While a human self of some sort is always present -the author of the comparison -the elements of which the comparison itself is composed may be entirely intra-personal or non-human. For example, one can make a crosstemporal comparison with past selves (the 'younger me' with 'today's me'), comparison with an ideal standard ('beauty', 'intelligence', 'morality'), or comparison with a counter-factual self ('me as I am' with 'me as I might have been', or 'me as I experience things here' with 'me as I would experience things there'). Comparison can also involve inanimate beings (a comparison of one law with another). What then is social comparison? As we shall understand it, social comparison has the following structure: it involves a human subject (X) being matched against a target person or persons (the comparator, Y) for assessment according to a particular dimension (Z). While the author of the comparison will not always make these terms explicit 4 -a degree of interpretation tends to be required -it should generally be possible for the observer to narrate the comparison act in these terms.
Probably the first of these terms is the most straightforward. X denotes a human actor of some kind. Evidently it need not include the author of the comparison him / herself. The comparison may be composed entirely of third persons, as when a law-maker considers which of two potential recipients of scarce resources is most deserving, or when a citizen chooses which party to vote for. 5 First-person comparisons will be our focus, since they have an immediacy and emotional involvement not present when the author detaches him-/ herself, but they are only one variety of several. Note also that the subject may appear in singular or plural form -as an 'I' or a 'we'. Note further that subjects may come with a certain category attached, e.g. 'we as women', 'we as black people', or 'I as a Muslim'. We shall return to some of the implications of this later.
Next in our formal sequence is the comparator, Y (sometimes termed the 'comparative reference group ' -Runciman 1966, p.11) . It may be useful to conceive three guises in which the comparator may appear. First (Type 1), it may be an individual who is closely familiar to the subject, probably as a result of repeated encounters. In such cases the subject will have a sizeable body of information about this person, enabling a variety of comparisons, and is likely to think of this person first as an individual and only secondarily as the representative of a social group. 6 Examples would be friends, family members and colleagues. Second (Type 2), the comparator may again be a really-existing person, but one encountered only briefly or occasionally. The subject therefore has limited information about them, and they remain largely a stranger. They may be associated primarily with a single context and treated either as a social type or, where their individuality is affirmed, as a distantly remembered 'name'. One's hairdresser or bank manager might be examples. Third (Type 3), the comparator may be an idealised type who is simply imagined by the subject. With this comparator there are no moments of co-presence, and they are necessarily thought of in generic terms (and also, therefore, as members of a group rather than as separable individuals). Their existence may be suggested to the subject on the basis of publicly available information (e.g. in the media, in official data, or in political discourse) and anecdotal knowledge or 'popular wisdom', mixed in with ingrained memories of past experiences. In this case the subject is dependent on their imagination and on narratives and knowledge resources external to their own conscious experience.
If one accepts these as analytical distinctions -and clearly there will be empirical instances whose correct assignment to one class or another will be a matter for debate -then one can accord them different kinds of significance.
The first kind -based on repeated co-presence -is the most private scenario, and its significance is likely to be local. Regarding the comparator in this way does not involve treating them as a manifestation of a larger context (the point is exactly that the individual is seen as transcending their circumstances) and so the implications of the comparison act are likewise likely to be for the subject as an individual. As regards the second kind -based on rare copresence -much is likely to depend on the contact situation (Pettigrew 1998 ).
There will be contexts in which the comparator's individuality is highlighted, and others where they appear primarily as categories: for example, when there is a clear mediating role relationship (a waiter serving a customer, a boss addressing an employee) which invites the situation to be experienced in stereotyped terms, or sharp markers of difference (e.g. language), or when the encounter is entirely new, with no previous interaction to refer to. Different situations will invite different forms of aspect perception. While in the first case the situation becomes analogous with that based on comparison with familiars, in the latter cases it moves closer to the third kind -comparison not grounded in co-presence. Here, with the comparator knowable only as a category (e.g. the 'worker', 'the Frenchman'), we have arguably the most political scenario. Politics in many of its forms requires people to think of each other in categorical terms -that is, to look beyond the peculiar characteristics of individuals and beyond whatever private connections one might have to them so as to place them in a larger scheme. 7 Comparisons of this kind facilitate the abstraction which politics requires. They are also political in the sense that they are the site of power relations, since they are peculiarly susceptible to manipulation, not being dependent on the subject's personal experiences. 8 We have introduced X and Y as persons, real or imagined. It is worth emphasising however that, even in those cases where they are real, it is not persons in their entirety which can be the currency of comparison. Given the complexity of any individual, they can never be apprehended with equal regard for all dimensions of their existence: comparison involves singling out a certain aspect on which to focus. This brings us to the third of our terms, Z, the dimension or criterion of comparison. This may take various forms: it may relate for instance to a person's circumstances (e.g. their problems or privileges), their skill in a certain task, or their opinions on a certain topic.
Where the comparator, Y, is simply an imagined social category, the criterion of comparison may be largely self-evident, since that category may have few dimensions of public significance. Where the comparator is evoked with greater specificity and complexity, and thus permits a wider range of comparisons, the subject will need to exercise discrimination in the dimension they choose. Note that Z can be anchored with respect to an ideal, such that X and Y are compared for how closely they approximate a transcendental standard, be it a positive one such as 'the moral life' or a negative one such as 'brutality'. Alternatively it can be strictly relative, such that X and Y are compared e.g. for the length of their hair, with no embedded notion that there is an ideal length.
Clearly, some dimensions of comparison will be of greater interest to the political sociologist than others. Facebook invites users to compare their 'friends' according to their looks and their smell, while daily life offers many opportunities to compare personal possessions such as mobile phones. While these practices are interesting in a number of ways, particularly from a socialpsychological perspective, their political implications are indirect at best.
More interesting in this regard is when the criterion of comparison concerns such non-trivial life circumstances as employment, living conditions, security, relative purchasing power, and so on -dimensions we shall return to shortly.
It is worth emphasising that the act of comparison may lead to varied outcomes. It may produce the affirmation of sameness or equivalence (an outcome our language usage may lead us to expect, in that when we term things 'comparable' we imply not only that they can be compared but that a comparison will lead us to conclude similarity), and a tendency to assimilate X and Y. Alternatively the outcome may be to affirm difference between the subject and the comparator, and thus to contrast X and Y -although such a conclusion still supposes the same metric can be applied to both, and therefore implies a second-order resemblance. In either case, the outcome can be treated as something positive, negative or neutral: it will be ascribed a These points may be summarised in tabular form:
Elements of social comparison X -the subject Y -the comparator Z -the dimension of comparison

Outcome Characteristics
Here: the firstperson pronouns, 'I' or 'we'
Type 1: a real individual, familiar due to repeated exposure Type 2: a real individual, but known through limited and contextspecific exposure, hence associated with just one or a small number of roles 
Overview of social comparison
Why though does social comparison matter? What are the reasons to study it? Arguably it has an intrinsic interest as a distinctive form of social practice, one irreducible to related notions such as 'identity'. Yet its significance goes beyond this. Indeed, much of human understanding has a comparative dimension. This includes, first, an understanding of oneself and one's predicaments. How an individual sees their own experiences will depend in part on how far they have the ability and inclination to place these in a larger context and see them as replicated elsewhere, or how far conversely they see these experiences as mainly specific to themselves. For instance, it matters greatly for a person's self-understanding whether they perceive certain economic difficulties as mainly a distinct, personal challenge or whether they see them as shared, and if the latter with whom they see them as shared and with whom not at all or less so. This may influence the extent to which they see these challenges as 'normal' or unusual, and how far they see them as appropriate targets for collective address or a matter for individual adaptation. Likewise, as a practice of interpretation rather than a material fact, social comparison cannot be assimilated to a positivist conception of shared identity or of the 'class in itself' (both of which take us back towards the realm of system integration). 9 Social comparison is a distinct category of practice and merits its own investigation.
Social Comparison in the Transnational Setting
What impact might the institutional changes associated with European integration have on practices of social comparison? Without itemising these system changes in detail -their particularities are in any case in flux -we can make the guiding assumption that they create new opportunities for social comparison and increase the likelihood it will take cross-national form. In the most general sense, this is because conditions of instability and change are always likely to be those which prompt recourse to comparison, since such conditions are disorienting and place the traditional scheme of things in doubt. It is when people become uncertain of their circumstances and status that they may be most impelled to seek reorientation through comparison.
But there are also more specific grounds for seeing these processes of change as conducive to social comparison. Let us examine a few of them.
First, these processes of system integration generate new kinds of social encounter, and thus new situations inviting social comparison. They contribute to many of the 'mobilities' identifiable amongst contemporary Europeans (Urry 2007, pp.10-11) . Prominent amongst these are those associated with temporary employment migration, tourist trips, family visits, the adventure-seeking travel of young people, travel for the purpose of receiving medical care, and long-term relocation for employment or retirement reasons. Some such movements will lead to in-depth crossnational acquaintanceships of the kind that invite Type 1 social comparisons.
Think for example of a chance encounter between students while Inter-Railing, developed into stronger attachments in the course of time spent travelling together, and later kept alive using a virtual network such as
Facebook. Think likewise of the Erasmus exchange. 10 As noted, these may not be the source of the most politically-interesting forms of social comparison, insofar as they generate mainly personal connections, but they are stimuli nonetheless. Of course, many such forms of mobility will not result in thick, repeated interactions but in one-off or occasional moments of co-presence: in this sense they may be conducive to Type 2 social comparisons. Modern life in general affords many such sites of encounter where strangers are brought together, from the metro carriage and the busstop to the shopping mall and the museum (Urry 2007, p.37) . Transnational integration, insofar as it intensifies cross-border movement, heightens the centrality of sites bringing together a potentially even more diverse set of strangers: the hotel, the airport, the beach, the carriage of the trans-continental train, the bars and clubs favoured by travellers and stag-nights, the (internationalised) university library and canteen, the football stadium, and the passport control queue.
One must be cautious in conceiving the wider significance of such encounters.
The guise in which people appear to one another in such locations may be quite site-specific: e.g. as the fellow passenger, the fellow shopper, the fellow drinker. Insofar as comparisons are provoked, they may be specific to the social categories associated with these situations: for instance, the beach may By making several of these susceptible to measurement on single, pan-European scales, EU integration invites them to be invoked in conjunction with each other, thus raising the appeal of any single comparative dimension.
Of course, transnational integration does not necessarily produce these outcomes, since it also has countervailing dynamics. One of its consequences, before the effects of common legislation are felt, may be to expose people to greater extremes. Think, for instance, of the migrant labourer who changes his reference groups while living abroad, and who unwittingly provides material for a new reference group both for those in the host society and those in the country of origin. For criteria of comparison such as wages or living conditions, such individuals may introduce new levels of variation. At best this may produce an assertion of difference -albeit one that supposes, as noted, sufficient similarity to apply the common metric by which difference can be observed. Just as plausibly it may encourage a retreat into narrower 12 The plausibility of comparison is likely to be deemed all the stronger where interdependence between subject and comparator is assumed: where, in other words, the circumstances of the comparator are considered not just equivalent to those of the subject but connected.
forms of comparison and a rejection of those that highlight wide discrepancies. We shall return to this point in due course.
The mere presumption on the subject's part that the experiences of distant strangers are of relevance is likely to be strongest where it has a basis in fact.
The question then is whether transnational integration comes accompanied by the availability of information which can give foundation to comparisons.
One thinks for instance of quantitative data of the kind which evokes social groups across European space as statistical categories -the kind of anonymous comparators one can associate with Type 3 comparison. 13 There are a wide range of criteria for which cross-national data can be collected:
data which affords comparison for instance of prices and purchasing power, of earnings across different employment sectors, of taxation rates for different income groups, of public spending in different policy sectors, of crime trends, and so on. Information of this kind is collected by countries around the world, and the possibility of drawing on it to make cross-national comparisons is hardly a novel phenomenon. But as comparativist social scientists have often been the first to discover, making cross-national comparisons on the basis of data aggregated separately in different countries can be highly problematic, since the methods used to collect it in different places may be quite dissimilar, and the categories used to organise it may have quite different thresholds of inclusion. The measurement of poverty and inequality is a classic instance: those classed as 'poor' in one country may be very much better off than those classed as poor in another (Fahey 2010 Clearly, where factual information of this kind is taken up in the media, its public diffusion is likely to be greater. of reference groups rather than a few targeted, 'bilateral' references to specific country groups -it nonetheless suggests an assumption of the national boundedness of comparison practices is problematic.
The point comes through also in qualitative research. 21 In a study conducted by the author (White 2011; 2009) , group interviews with citizens in Germany, Britain and the Czech Republic concerning a range of everyday problems (e.g.
high and rising prices, low wages) produced a number of spontaneous crossnational comparisons. One of the study's suggested findings is that, in line with the above, the range of comparators is likely to vary according to the criterion of comparison (i.e. where Z changes, so one can expect Y to change).
Whereas economic issues tend to produce comparisons with neighbouring
European countries (but not necessarily Europe as a whole), issues to do with intergroup relations (e.g. the ability to successfully integrate immigrants) tend to provoke a wider range of comparators more broadly associated with the But here lies the crux: such symmetry of practice seems unlikely. Social comparison, it has been suggested, is pursued with most urgency by those who sense or fear that in relative terms they are not doing well. Those who are comfortably off (by whatever criterion) may be less aware of their 22 Note also that European integration has the potential to generate new criteria of comparison (Z) which produce new scales of advantage and disadvantage -e.g. to do with the ability to access the benefits of integration itself. The very novelty of these dimensions may give them added levels of public resonance. 23 For an overview of different emotional responses to social comparison, see Smith in Suls and Wheeler 2000, esp. p.176, which describes four basic variants: downward-assimilative comparisons (producing shared concerns and sympathy), downwards-contrastive (with contempt / Schadenfreude / self-satisfaction), upward-contrastive (with envy / depression) and upward-assimilative (with admiration / inspiration / optimism).
advantage, and less concerned to verify it, than are those less well off. 24 The latter have added incentive to engage in comparison, whether to learn more about their predicament or to console themselves with the knowledge that it is shared, perhaps even experienced more severely elsewhere. 25 comparisons reveal to be advantaged; efforts to rationalise the discrepancy e.g. by appeal to notions of merit; moves to close the gap through individual adaptation; an inclination to retreat from wider social commitments so as to minimise the adverse feelings they produce; or a tendency to deny the feasibility of cross-national comparison, or to switch the dimension of comparison (Z) so as to produce more favourable results (e.g. to renounce a prosperity criterion in favour of a morality one -'they' are rich, but 'I' / 'we' are good). 27 One is reminded of Elster's description of the 'sour grapes' phenomenon, a classic strategy for coping with dissatisfaction (Elster 1985) .
In the short to medium term, cross-national comparisons would then seem to have few destabilising political consequences. Indeed, insofar as they relativise experiences (e.g. of poverty) by showing how there is 'always someone worse off', they may produce apathy and prove actively immobilising. 28 Still, in the longer term, this tendency could be expected to have subversive consequences, as it might easily entail the slow ebbing of support for the very institutional frameworks which prompt these 27 A retreat from social comparison may be accentuated insofar as integration exposes individuals to those whose preferred criteria of assessment are different from their own, and who thus serve to undermine the validity of the reference criteria hitherto invoked -a variation of Durkheim's anomie. 28 This effect is accentuated insofar as integration exposes individuals to those prioritising criteria of assessment different from their own, and who thus undermine the validity of the reference criteria hitherto invoked.
unfavourable comparisons. The EU's political legitimacy would in this way be weakened.
Yet there is a counter-tendency one might also foresee: an emergent awareness of personal disadvantage spurring moves to seek out others who share in this predicament, perhaps so as to make common cause. The initial act of social comparison which reveals relative disadvantage, and which therefore has an unsettling character, would thus be coupled with a second one that re-embeds the individual in a larger collective and forms the basis for an enlarged sense of 'we'. In this scenario, social comparison fosters the emergence of new bonds of solidarity and cross-national subjecthood. It enables moves towards the emergence of classes for themselves, as the familiar terminology has it (though classes in the broad, not necessarily economic, sense). This way lies the transnationalisation of social cleavages and potentially their politicisation at a European level. Insofar as these forms of subjecthood translate into specific political demands, one could expect them to impinge on the institutional structure of the EU and its legal order in the form of pressure for its redesign -i.e. to have fairly immediate consequences for system integration. Protest movements, including contemporary ones against the 'austerity' programmes being pushed by governments across Europe, involve efforts to evoke a popular sense of equivalence with precisely such goals in mind, and when their organisers acknowledge the inspiration of counterparts abroad they themselves are testifying to the mobilisatory capacity of the comparative logic. 29
Again, for clarity's sake, we can express these alternatives in propositional form:
2a) The adaptation thesis: when cross-national social comparisons heighten perceptions of relative deprivation, citizens will look for narratives that can rationalise this, and / or make individual efforts to change their relative standing, and / or resist the making of comparisons, and / or seek to restructure them in more favourable ways.
2b) The mobilisation thesis: when cross-national social comparisons heighten perceptions of relative deprivation, citizens will seek out and make common cause with those revealed to be similarly disadvantaged.
Here is not the place to settle the matter, but perhaps the following can be noted. Scholars of relative deprivation make a potentially relevant distinction concerning how the comparison subject (figure X in our typology) comes to be articulated. When a speaker presents their sense of comparative disadvantage using the first person singular, 'I', this may be referred to as personal deprivation: it is as an individual that the subject feels deprived.
When a speaker presents the matter using the first person plural 'we', this may be thought of as group deprivation: it is as part of a collective that the subject feels deprived (Walker and Smith 2002) . 30 Both can be a basis for comparison, but the consequences of the first are likely to be mainly psychological and local -e.g. individual displeasure, and perhaps an individual effort to improve relative standing -rather than an organised effort to find collective voice. The consequences of the second on the other hand may be wider in scope and more likely to bring social change:
comparisons formulated in this way suggest that individual responses are inappropriate, and suggest the possibility of common cause. This would suggest that, as a minimum condition for orchestrated efforts at wider change, the subject's comparison of their circumstances with those of cross-national 30 Runciman 1966, pp.31ff ., makes a related distinction between egoistic and fraternalist deprivation.
others must take the form of a comparison of 'people like us', not merely of 'individuals like me'. In contemporary Europe, this disposition hardly seems extinguished, but must contend nevertheless with a tendency in public discourse to individualise the citizen, and to acknowledge political demands primarily in the form of individual rights (White 2009 (White , 2010 .
Much is also likely to depend on whether the discrepancies which social comparison reveals are held to be remediable or unavoidable. For even where there is a sense of collective deprivation, this may produce no more than silent acquiescence if it is felt to be rooted in immutable conditions. 31
There needs to be the sense that tomorrow can be better than today. The implications of social comparison are inseparable from the wider political narratives by which those comparisons and their meaning are shaped (White 2011 ). There is an interesting interplay here between social comparison and perceptions of agency. On the one hand, it is through comparisons that the space for agency can be opened, since those which highlight the variety of human experience show the ways in which things could be different -e.g. the different ways in which public services can be organised and financed.
Encouraging comparisons is one way of affirming the possibility of alternatives and reducing political acquiescence. On the other hand, comparisons unaccompanied by a narrative about the possibility of realising these alternatives, 'here' as much as 'there', may rather provoke envy or demoralisation. In all these aspects one sees the dimension of power: those who shape these wider narratives, be they partisan actors in the parliamentary sphere or the media, have considerable influence over the extent to which the fruits of comparison are resignation or agitation. Their ability to 'nudge' people towards a certain comparator (Sunstein and Thaler 2008) , and to influence how the comparison act is interpreted, is a notable source of power.
Conclusion
This paper has examined how processes of system integration at the transnational level present new opportunities for the practices of social comparison. By generating diverse social encounters, new information resources, and an extension in the scope of common legislation, these processes invite citizens to compare their daily experiences with those of people further afield and to evoke reference groups outside their country of residence. Conceptions e.g. of economic hardship -who experiences it, who escapes it -have the potential thereby to draw in reference-points beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Drawing on findings from recent research, the paper has discussed how far, and when, such possibilities are likely to be realised, and the potential political significance of these practices.
To what extent should the comparison act be seen as a contribution to social integration? Clearly we are dealing with something much less demanding than is implied by notions of common identity. The structure of social comparison asserts the fact that the subject and comparator are ontologically separable, even if deemed to be similar -and any assertion of similarity is always specific to a particular metric of comparison. At the same time social comparison may form the basis for the emergence of thicker ties. Stronger bonds of collectivity may well demand the prior recognition of an equivalence of social position, as well as the motivation to find common cause that a sense of injustice promotes. By widening public conceptions of social and political space, and underscoring similarities and discrepancies of experience, comparisons offer an enabling context for this. They offer the basis on which further political narratives may draw. However, though they may be a necessary condition of deeper social integration, they are hardly a sufficient one. In some forms they may have the opposite effect of causing political disengagement and the rejection of the institutional arrangements that enable them. Comparisons can be divisive as well as integrative. Their ultimate contribution will depend as much on the kind of comparisons citizens are invited to make and the conclusions they are encouraged to draw -factors inseparable from larger efforts to shape the contours of political commonsense.
Let us conclude with some observations on what cross-national comparison implies for the continuing hold of the nation-state as the reference-point for popular self-understanding. As we have indicated, the subject (X) and comparator (Y) of social comparison need in no way be denominated using national categories: numerous alternatives are possible (professional, genderbased, generational, etc.), and when these are invoked there is no reason to suppose their frame of reference will be domestic to the national sphere.
Social comparison thereby reduces the salience of national boundaries, even without putting them in question. Where comparisons do refer to the national unit (think of the league-tables mentioned), a twin process is at work: the relevance of the national unit is reaffirmed, yet it is simultaneously placed in a larger frame, inviting the citizen to step back to adopt a broader perspective. National boundaries remain a landmark, but no longer form the horizon. Social comparison thus effects a shift in their status. In doing so, it may also put strain on some varieties of nationalist thought. Social comparison can have an unsettling quality, placing established ideas of status in question, and undermining notions of the privileged self. It makes a precarious underpinning for national pride. Furthermore, as we have seen with parts of the British media, comparisons may come more easily with those neighbouring European countries held in little affection than with those more distant countries (e.g. the US) with whom such outlets actively promote popular identification. Such discrepancies are logically tenable, but require a double gaze that may be difficult to sustain. They remind at the same time that there is a multi-dimensionality to even the most Eurosceptic orientations, one that would be missed if one focused exclusively on practices of identification.
